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I. INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, rejecting the so-called scope-of-thepatent test for reverse payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman
pharmaceutical litigation.2 It also rejected the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Third Circuit’s arguments for
presumptive illegality of reverse payments, declaring that the
rule of reason is the appropriate framework in which to
evaluate such settlements.3 In arguments before the Supreme
Court, Actavis supported the scope-of-the-patent test, which
would have insulated most reverse payment settlements from
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1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Id. at 2230–31, 2238.
3. Id. at 2237–38.
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antitrust scrutiny,4 while the FTC argued that reverse
payments should be presumptively unlawful.5 In declaring that
the rule of reason should govern the antitrust analysis of
reserve payment settlements, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the arguments of both parties.6
Proponents of the scope-of-the-patent test focus on the
patentee’s right, under patent law, to exclude others.7 They
argue, therefore, that reverse payment settlements should be
presumed to be lawful as long as the settlement does not
impose competitive restraints that go beyond the scope of the
patent.8 On the other hand, those who advocate that reverse
payment settlements should be considered presumptively
unlawful maintain that such settlements nearly always have
anticompetitive effects.9 In fact, reverse payments have the
potential both to harm and to benefit consumers. Consequently,
the scope-of-the-patent test is likely to allow some settlements
that are in fact anticompetitive, while treating reverse
payments as presumptively illegal is likely to prevent some
settlements that are procompetitive or competitively neutral.
The Supreme Court rightly rejected both approaches and
mandated that lower courts take a more nuanced approach,
analyzing reverse payment settlements under the rule of
reason.
In doing so, the Court provided little guidance on how such
analyses should be carried out, leaving it to lower courts to
develop the analytical framework in which to assess these
settlement agreements. In this Article, we discuss the economic
and legal underpinnings of the relevant issues and offer some
guidance on the key economic questions that lower courts will
need to assess as they proceed under the rule of reason.

4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416).
5. Id. at 9.
6. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
7. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 18, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705.
8. Cf. id. at 46–47.
9. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 15–24, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027.
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II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMPETING POSITIONS
AND THE COURT’S RULING
A. THE FTC’S ARGUMENT THAT REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE PRESUMPTIVELY UNLAWFUL
The FTC argued for both a per se rule and a quick look
approach to reverse settlements. The FTC’s primary argument
was that reverse-payment agreements should be treated as
presumptively unlawful because they are similar to unlawful
horizontal restraints of trade.10 Specifically, the FTC contended
that reverse payments have the anticompetitive effect of
“[r]aising price, reducing output, and dividing markets.”11
The FTC claimed that the patentee has the ability and the
incentive to pay the would-be generic entrant more than the
generic firm would have earned if it had entered into the
market:
In the pharmaceutical industry . . . standard economic theory
predicts that a brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly profits will
greatly exceed the combined profits that the brand-name and
generic manufacturers could earn if they competed against each
other for sales of the same drug. The brand-name manufacturer’s
monopoly profits are large enough to pay its would-be generic
competitors more than they could hope to earn if they entered the
market, while still leaving the brand-name manufacturer greater
profits than it could earn in the face of generic competition.12

The FTC went on to argue that “[i]n substance, a reversepayment agreement is a mechanism for inducing the generic
manufacturer to forgo its own output, as a way to increase the
manufacturers’ combined profits, at the expense of competition
and consumer welfare.”13
The FTC argued for the application of a quick look
approach to reverse payments because the respondents’
conduct closely resembles conduct that is usually or almost
always harmful to competition.14 Under this approach, the
agreement would be presumed anticompetitive and the
defendant would have the burden of providing procompetitive
justifications for the conduct.15 The FTC contended that
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 20 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 777 (1999)).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 33 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 771).

80

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

because both parties benefit from monopolistic pricing, there is
a strong incentive to prolong the period of the brand name’s
exclusivity.16 A quick look test is also administratively efficient
because it would not require a full evaluation of the scope of the
patent and would obviate the need for a costly patent trial
within an antitrust trial.17
Acknowledging that public policy generally favors
settlements, the FTC argued that reverse payments are an
exception because of their tendency to reduce competition.18
Moreover, the FTC argued that the scope-of-the-patent test
ignores the strength of the patent involved.19 Further, the FTC
looked to the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
show that Congress intended to promote rapid and timely entry
of generics into brand-name drug markets.20 In the FTC’s view,
these goals and purposes would be frustrated if reverse
payments were routinely allowed to delay generic entry into
the market.21
B. ACTAVIS ARGUED FOR THE SCOPE-OF-THE-PATENT TEST
Actavis argued against the Government’s proposed “quick
look” test.22 Primarily Actavis argued that the government had
not shown that reverse payments result in “‘obvious’ and
‘actual[ ] anticompetitive effects,’”23 citing studies that indicate
that reverse payments are not always, or even usually,
anticompetitive.24
Further, according to Actavis, the Government’s proposed
rule does not take into account the patent holder’s lawful right

16. Id. at 34–36.
17. Id. at 54–55.
18. Id. at 46–49.
19. Id. at 44.
20. Id. at 3, 30–32. “The Hatch-Waxman Amendments reflect a strong
congressional policy that favors testing the scope and validity of
pharmaceutical patents, with a view to realizing the benefits of generic
competition at the earliest appropriate time.” Id. at 30–31 (citing C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1614 (2006)).
21. Id. at 30–32.
22. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 16, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705.
23. Id. at 13 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 775 n.12
(1999)).
24. Id. at 23–25.
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to exclude competitors.25 Actavis believes that its patent gives
it the unqualified right to exclude all competition through any
means it finds necessary, so long as the settlement does not
exceed the scope of the patent in either length or breadth of the
patent’s terms.26 Such means, of course, include reversepayment settlements of patent infringement suits.27
Actavis also argued that the Government’s “quick look”
rule would result in unintended consequences.28 Such a rule
would chill settlements and induce lengthy and costly
Moreover,
Actavis
contended
that
the
litigation.29
Government’s rule is so ambiguous that it would cause
confusion in the industry that would deter the innovation and
research that leads to new drugs and would limit the number of
Paragraph IV patent challenges by generic pharmaceutical
companies.30
C. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT’S QUICK
LOOK APPROACH
The FTC’s desire for a quick look approach is likely to
result in many decisions that condemn procompetitive
outcomes or dramatically deter the consummation of
procompetitive transactions. Reverse payments may, under
certain circumstances, (1) encourage generic abbreviated new
drug application filings; (2) allow generic entry earlier than
would have occurred if the patent had been litigated; (3) protect
valid pharmaceutical patents from infringement; (4) avoid high
or excessive litigation costs; and (5) facilitate bona fide side
deals. Thus, reverse payment settlements may enhance
efficiency and benefit consumers.31

25. Id. at 19–20.
26. Cf. id. at 12 (“The patent laws provide a patentee (here, the brandname drug manufacturer) with a lawful right to exclude alleged infringers.
This Court’s antitrust precedent recognizes that, so long as the patentee
operates within the exclusionary bounds of its patent monopoly, the antitrust
laws do not forbid the patentee’s conduct.” (citations omitted)).
27. Id. at 12–13.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 39–40.
30. Id. at 40.
31. For another opinion on why the FTC’s proposed quick look is the
wrong approach, see Sumanth Addanki, Alan J. Daskin & Christine S. Meyer,
High Court Brings Economics Back to Pay-for-Delay Analysis, LAW360 (June
17, 2013), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Law360_
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Addanki, Daskin, and Meyer outline some of the flaws in
the FTC’s argument.32 They consider a hypothetical patent suit
in which the objective probability that either party will win the
litigation is 0.5 (i.e., a fifty percent chance for each party).33
Assume, for simplicity, that discovery is complete and that the
outcome of the trial will be known quickly. In that case, the
expected date of generic entry under litigation would be half
the time left until the expiration of the patent.34 It might seem,
therefore, that both parties would be willing to settle the
litigation, without any side payments, by agreeing that the
generic will enter at that date: if the patent runs for another
ten years, the parties should be willing to settle the dispute by
agreeing that the generic will enter in five years. Moreover, it
might seem that the parties could not agree on any other date
of entry: the patentee would not agree to earlier entry, and the
generic firm would not agree to delay entry until a later date.
In such circumstances, the FTC apparently believes that a pure
term-split settlement, in which the parties agree that the
generic will enter at that date, is the appropriate settlement.
The Commission seems to believe that any payment from the
brand-name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer is
effectively a payoff or bribe to delay generic entry beyond the
date of such a (hypothetical) pure term split.35
In fact, the FTC’s argument is overly simplistic. For one
thing, a pure term-split settlement may not be feasible. While
the objective probability that either party will win the suit may
be 0.5 (fifty percent), each party may be somewhat more
optimistic about its chances; in formal terms, their subjective
probabilities may diverge from the objective probabilities. The
PayforDelay_0613.pdf. The paper concludes that “a settlement with a reverse
payment may in fact allow for entry earlier than might be expected with
continued litigation, thus benefiting consumers.” Id.
32. Id.
33. The argument in the text does not hinge on the parties’ having equal
probabilities of success in the litigation. In the discussion above, we assume
equal probabilities for simplicity only.
34. See Addanki, Daskin & Meyer, supra note 31. Another way of stating
this is that “[l]itigation, therefore, represents a lottery with two possible
outcomes; the value of the lottery to each firm is simply the mathematical
expected value—the probability-weighted average—of the values of the two
outcomes.” Sumanth Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement
Agreements, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2133 (2008).
35. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2130–31.
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patentee (brand-name pharmaceutical company), for example,
may believe that it has a sixty percent chance (i.e., a
probability of 0.6) of prevailing, while the would-be generic
entrant may think that the patentee has only a forty percent
chance of prevailing (i.e., a probability of 0.4). If each party
then bases its settlement strategies on its view of the
(statistically) expected outcome of the litigation, the patentee
would not agree to allow generic entry in less than six years,
and the generic firm would not agree to wait more than four
years before entering. Neither party, it would seem, would
agree to settle for entry at any time between four and six years.
In short, a pure term split would not be feasible.
In reality, however, both parties may consider more than
simply the expected outcome under litigation. If, as is often the
case, the patentee earns a substantial fraction of its profits
from the pharmaceutical in question, it might be particularly
concerned about an unfavorable outcome: if it loses the
litigation, the generic firm will enter immediately and the
brand-name firm’s profits will plummet. In formal terms, the
patentee may be risk-averse. If so, the brand-name firm might
be willing to agree to generic entry in, say, four-and-a-half (4.5)
years. The certainty that generic entry will not be even
earlier—in the extreme, as soon as the trial ends—may
compensate for the fact that the generic will enter at a date
that is earlier than the expected date under litigation.36
Even so, the generic firm might still be unwilling to wait
more than four years. If so, a pure term-split settlement would
still not be feasible. In that case, however, the patentee might
be willing to offer the would-be entrant a payment to induce it
to accept a settlement with entry after four-and-a-half years. If
the parties do in fact agree to such a settlement, (i) there is a
so-called reverse payment (from the patentee to the potential
infringer); but (ii) entry will be earlier than the (objective)
expected date of entry under litigation; so consumers will be
better off than they would have been had the parties proceeded
with the litigation.37

36. Recall that the expected date is a probability-weighted average of the
possible dates of entry (in this case, a probability-weighted average of entry
immediately and entry at the expiration of the patent).
37. The Supreme Court briefly considers the possible implications of risk
aversion and then brushes the concern aside without any substantive
discussion. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“The owner
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Even if the parties’ subjective probabilities do coincide with
the objective probabilities, a reverse-payment settlement may
be procompetitive. If the parties agree that there is a fifty
percent chance that either will prevail, the patentee, because of
risk aversion, may prefer certain entry after, say, four years to
expected—but uncertain—entry after five years if the parties
litigate their dispute. The generic firm, of course, would also
prefer to enter in four years rather than five. But if the wouldbe entrant has limited liquidity, it might not be able to wait
that long; after all, until it enters, it earns no profits on the
product. Again, a payment by the patentee to the generic firm
may make it feasible for the parties to agree to a settlement in
which the generic enters four years from now. In this case, too,
there is a reverse payment, but consumers benefit from the
settlement: generic entry occurs in four years, one year earlier
than expected under litigation.38
The real world, therefore, is considerably more complicated
than the simplistic world in which reverse payments
necessarily imply competitive harm. Although previous
commentators have advocated for rules similar to the FTC’s
quick look, a fact-based inquiry into the particular details of
the settlement in question is required to analyze the
competitive implication of an agreement.39

of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a small
risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the
payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of
competition.”).
38. See Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2130–31, app. A at 2139–44,
for further discussion of these and related issues, including the parties’
potentially differing discount rates and views of future market developments.
39. Many commentators have advocated for a rule that assumes harm.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759–60
(2003) (arguing for presumptive illegality of patent settlements designed to
delay entry, which in an antitrust context would automatically shift the initial
burden to the defendant to provide procompetitive justifications of the
conduct); see also Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747, 785 (2002) (arguing that district courts should consider preliminary
injunctions and, if they then deny one, apply the “quick look” approach, as the
settlement is then usually anticompetitive).
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D. THE COURT SEIZES THE MIDDLE GROUND
In Actavis, the Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason
for reverse payment settlements—and, in doing so, rejected the
primary arguments of both the FTC and Actavis.
With respect to the FTC’s arguments, the Court stated:
“The FTC urges us to hold that reverse payment settlement
agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts
reviewing such agreements should proceed via a ‘quick look’
approach rather than applying a ‘rule of reason.’ . . . We decline
to do so.”40
The Court also explicitly rejected the scope-of-the-patent
test championed by Actavis and other pharmaceutical
manufacturers.41 Had the Court endorsed the scope-of-thepatent test, the FTC effectively would have lost any ability to
file suit against such settlements. The resulting rule allows the
FTC to investigate and selectively enforce cases against reverse
payments.
The Court sets forth several examples of how reverse
payments can harm and have harmed consumers by preventing
competition on the merits and deterring the entry of generic
drugs.42 The Court notes that reverse payments may, in some
circumstances, facilitate horizontal collusion between
competitors or potential competitors in the same market.43
Thus, the scope-of-the-patent test might have immunized some
settlements that [would have] harmed consumers.
The Court lists five reasons why the FTC should be able to
present its full antitrust case under the rule of reason. Reverse
payments (1) have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition;” but (2) concerns about such effects will
“sometimes prove unjustified;” (3) “where a reverse payment
threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the
patentee likely “possesses the power to bring that harm about
in practice;” moreover, (4) the rule of reason is administratively
feasible for courts; and (5) the possibility of antitrust liability
does not prevent the parties from settling their dispute.44

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id. at 2230–31.
Id. at 2232.
Id.
Id. at 2234–37.
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III. “STRUCTURING” THE RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
As it often does, the Court “leave[s] to the lower courts the
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”45
Nevertheless, the Court does indicate some areas that it thinks
the district courts should focus on:
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to
the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from
other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of
any other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.46

In this section, we provide some commentary on some of
the issues that the courts should consider in a rule of reason
analysis of reverse payment settlements.
A. MONOPOLY POWER
Any rule of reason analysis has to begin with a monopoly
power screen. Without some showing that the brand-name firm
has monopoly power in a relevant antitrust market, a reverse
payment could not have anticompetitive effects.47 Moreover,
proper delineation of the relevant market is not always as
obvious or straightforward as it might seem. In some cases, the
brand-name pharmaceutical may indeed be able to charge a
premium price because there are no good therapeutic
alternatives to constrain its pricing of the drug. In that case,
the molecule sold by the brand-name firm may constitute the
45. Id. at 2238 (emphasis added); id. (“[T]rial courts can structure
antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust
theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other,
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light
it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of significant
unjustified anticompetitive consequences.”); see, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007) (“As courts gain experience
considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over
the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure
the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and
to provide more guidance to businesses.”).
46. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
47. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey P. Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on ReversePayment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57,
116 (2010); see also Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2136 (“If there is no
monopoly power present, there is no need for any further inquiry; the
agreement could not be anticompetitive in its effect.”).
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relevant market, and the brand-name firm may have monopoly
power.
In other cases, however, there may be numerous
therapeutic alternatives to the brand firm’s product. In such
cases, any price premium that the brand-name product enjoys
may reflect nothing more than a return on the firm’s
advertising, medical detailing, and similar efforts.48 If so, the
relevant market at issue likely extends beyond the molecule
sold by the brand-name firm, and the firm does not have
monopoly power. In such a case, no further analysis is needed;
the agreement is not likely to be anticompetitive.
It is worth noting in this connection that the FTC has, in
the past, suggested that any branded drug represents a
relevant market in its own right.49 In effect, the FTC’s (and
many private plaintiffs’) argument runs as follows: typically, a
generic entrant can take substantial sales from the incumbent
branded drug and the average price falls significantly after
entry, which, according to the FTC, is “direct evidence” that the
incumbent must have possessed monopoly power prior to the
entry.50
While this argument may appear to have some superficial
intuitive appeal, it is unusable in the world of pharmaceuticals,
because it entirely overlooks the institutional characteristics of
the pharmaceutical industry, in particular, the nature of

48. Cf. Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of
Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving
Delayed Entry of Generic Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 81, 118 (2004) (“Product
heterogeneity and variation in individual patient response to medication are
factors that create conditions in which product differentiation and
promotion—in the form of sales calls to physicians (‘detailing’), journal
advertising, direct to consumer advertising, and drug sampling—often become
the primary driver of demand for brand-name products.”).
49. See, e.g., Complaint Counsel’s Opposition to Upsher-Smith’s Motion to
Dismiss at 21–22, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2002).
50. See, e.g., id. at 8–24; M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 667 (2003) (noting that
two FTC officials have explained the position “that brand-name and generic
drugs ‘typically are not in the same product market’” and that “‘FTC
investigations typically have found that because of the significant price
difference between generic and brand name versions, an increase in the price
of the brand name version does not lead consumers to switch to the generic
version, and vice versa’” (quoting David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven,
Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 255, 259 (1999))). Morse then attributes the FTC’s error to the Cellophane
Fallacy. Id. at 670–75.
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competition from “AB-Rated Generics.”51 To see this, consider
two polar cases of generic entry. In the first case, assume that
the branded drug confers genuine therapeutic advantages over
any existing formulation, supporting a premium price for that
drug. Once practitioners are made aware of these advantages,
the therapeutic benefits will sustain the price premium as long
as no equivalent substitute product is available. As noted
above, under these conditions the branded drug could have
monopoly power (although, of course, the inquiry would not
stop there).
In the second case, consider a branded drug that confers no
material therapeutic benefit over existing alternatives, but
whose patent covers an alternative (technically unique)
delivery mechanism, which can be exploited by creative
marketing and brand-building activities; any price premium
depends entirely on the brand awareness created by
advertising and marketing efforts. This is little different from
branded white bread being more expensive than a private label
of equal or even greater objective quality: the premium is not a
reflection of monopoly power, but is merely the economic return
to advertising/promotional efforts. The problem is that the
effects of AB-rated generic entry will be similar enough that
the FTC’s so-called “direct test” will not be able to distinguish
these two polar cases. The first drug will continue to be
prescribed for its benefits (as long as no other branded
substitutes are available) and substitution laws will ensure
that (a) the generic will be dispensed in place of the brand and
(b) that the average price paid will fall as a result. In the
second case, too, prescriptions written for the brand will be
filled with the generic, again resulting in reduced average
prices. In both cases, therefore, the conclusion will be that

51. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415
(D. Del. 2006) (“Pharmacists may dispense the generic equivalent for a
branded drug when the branded drug is prescribed by a physician. Such
substitution is allowed, however, only if the generic drug has been ‘AB-rated’
by the FDA, which means not only that the generic drug is bioequivalent to
the branded drug, but also that the generic has the same form, dosage, and
strength. Therefore, an approved generic drug that is not AB-rated against a
currently available branded drug, because, for example, the drugs have
different formulations or dosages, may not be substituted for the branded drug
and may only be sold, if at all, as a separately branded, rather than generic,
drug.” (citations omitted)).
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there was monopoly power enjoyed by the brand, which is
obviously incorrect.
B. DID THE PATENTEE ACTUALLY MAKE A REVERSE PAYMENT?
In some cases, what looks like a reverse payment may be
nothing of the sort. Pharmaceutical companies often enter into
multiple agreements at the same time. While settling on a
mutually agreeable date for generic entry, for example, the
brand-name firm may buy from the generic firm the right to
sell a different drug.52 If so, a payment will flow from the
patentee to the generic firm, but there can be no presumption
that it is a reverse payment: that payment does not necessarily
have anything to do with the settlement of the patent
infringement suit.53 To be sure, if the patentee pays an
artificially inflated price for the right to sell the second drug,
the payment may be designed to conceal what is in fact a
reverse payment. But a fact-based inquiry would be required to
establish that fact.54
In Actavis, the Court clearly recognized the need for
consideration of the possibility that the alleged reverse
payment is not anticompetitive:
The reverse payment, for example, may amount to no more than a
rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the
settlement. That payment may reflect compensation for other
services that the generic has promised to perform—such as
distributing the patented item or helping to develop a market for
that item. There may be other justifications. Where a reverse
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as

52. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“Schering and Upsher entered settlement discussions. During
these discussions, Schering refused to pay Upsher to simply ‘stay off the
market,’ and proposed a compromise on the entry date of Klor Con . . . .
Although still opposed to paying Upsher for holding Klor Con’s release date,
Schering agreed to a separate deal to license other Upsher products.”).
53. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
641 (2009) (“If settlement and delay occur as part of a larger set of
transactions between the two firms, how do we know that the payment was
made in exchange for delay, rather than for some other valuable
consideration? Often, this is a difficult question.”).
54. Kenneth Glazer & Jenée Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard
Cases Even Under Good Law, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 14, 19 (“Just
because a thing of value was given to the generic company does not
necessarily mean that that thing of value was in return for an agreement to
delay. The nexus would still need to be shown.”).
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avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the
same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid
the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement. In
such cases, the parties may have provided for a reverse payment
without having sought or brought about the anticompetitive
consequences we mentioned above. But that possibility does not
justify dismissing the FTC’s complaint. An antitrust defendant may
show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are
present, thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and
showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.55

The Court’s recognition that some payments that appear to
be reverse payments are, in fact, not payments that might lead
to concern about anticompetitive effects is an important
justification for applying the rule of reason to the entire
category of transactions.
C. THE SIZE OF THE REVERSE PAYMENT, MARKET POWER, AND
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
In Actavis, the Court suggested a shortcut for proving
market power:
At least, the “size of the payment from a branded drug
manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of
power”—namely, the power to charge prices higher than the
competitive level. An important patent itself helps to assure such
power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to pay “large
sums” to induce “others to stay out of its market.” In any event, the
Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse payment
agreements are associated with the presence of higher-thancompetitive profits—a strong indication of market power.56

The relative size of the reverse payment can be an
indicator of the anticompetitive nature of the deal. As a matter
of economics, the Supreme Court placed unwarranted emphasis
on this factor, but under certain conditions it can be an
indicator of harm. Those conditions include (1) settlements
where the payment makes up a large portion of the patent
holder’s monopoly rents; (2) where the generic is being paid
more than it would make from entry into the market; and (3)
where the payment is significantly larger than the costs of
litigation.57 However, this indicator is not a substitute for proof
of monopoly power.
55. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 47, at 117–18 (arguing that reverse
payments that set arbitrary numerical limits do not accurately reflect a sound
economic rule of reason approach).
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D. CONSIDERATIONS OF PATENT STRENGTH
One essential element of the rule of reason inquiry is to
evaluate, at least to a first approximation, the likelihood of
success in the patent infringement suit.58 This may involve
consideration of traditional doctrinal patent requirements such
as newness, non-obviousness, the level of scrutiny that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office gave the patent, and the result of
past litigation over the patent.59 When the patent is considered
strong, there is a higher likelihood that the patent holder
would have prevailed at trial, making the settlement
procompetitive or benign. A weak patent may indicate that any
settlement is anticompetitive.60
Many commentators, lawyers, and agency sources have
reluctantly agreed that a comprehensive antitrust examination
requires an evaluation of patent strength. Carl Shapiro has
written that,
[T]o compare consumer surplus under a settlement with consumer
surplus from ongoing litigation requires an informed judgment as to
the strength of the patent(s) at issue. If the patent is very strong,
i.e., very likely to be found valid and infringed and difficult to invent
around, the challenger is unlikely to offer much independent
competition to the patentholder if litigation proceeds.61

He concludes that “there does not appear to be any way
around the need to assess patent strength directly if one is
trying to determine whether a settlement benefits
consumers.”62 At one time the Department of Justice (DOJ)
also supported this position.63 The DOJ, however, flipped its
58. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2137.
59. As one example, consider the facts of Tamoxifen, where the patent at
issue had already been invalidated by a district court and the settlement
revoked that invalidation through the use of vacatur. In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006). A challenge to the
settlement could likely presume a very weak patent since the issue had
already been litigated.
60. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2137. Addanki and Daskin go on
to indicate that this does not mean that there needs to be a complete patent
validity lawsuit. They contend that the court would need to determine “the
objective odds that each party will prevail in the litigation, not the parties’
subjective estimates of those odds . . . . [I]t is not generally necessary to
estimate those odds with tremendous precision.” Id.
61. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 391, 397 (2003).
62. Id.
63. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Joblove v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 549 U.S. 1277 (2007) (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1511527.
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view and supported instead the quick look approach in the
Arkansas Carpenters case.64
Although a complicated inquiry, this result is required and
supported by the court’s opinion because the anticompetitive
nature of reverse payments is not at all obvious from a mere
quick look. As Addanki and Daskin, in an apparently counterintuitive insight, have articulated:
Agreements that involve reverse payments may, in fact, be
procompetitive relative to litigation, while apparently innocuous
agreements that involve no such payments may, in fact, be
anticompetitive relative to the litigation alternative. There is,
therefore, no substitute for closer, fact-specific analysis of the
agreement and its context.65

This reasoning emphasizes that—unlike what the Court
believes—the rule of reason is almost never efficient.
Determining the likely competitive effects in a market and the
outcome any settlement will have on consumers is inherently
difficult and requiring of a detailed and extended analysis into
market factors. Reverse payments, especially as they are
burdened by undetermined and complicated questions of patent
strength and validity, are certainly no exception.
That being said, the burden in the antitrust inquiry may
be much lower than many commentators—including the FTC—
have suggested. That is because for every such settlement
agreement, there is a federal judge who has acquired
considerable knowledge of the merits of the underlying patent
case and, more often than not, has construed the claims of the
patent in a Markman ruling.66 It seems entirely likely that a
judge in that position has more than enough information about
the underlying patent suit to have an informed judgment of the
strength of the patent, certainly enough to be able to judge—
aided by expert analysis if necessary—whether a given
settlement of that suit is likely to benefit consumers.

64. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 47, at 86 n.181 (quoting Brief for the
United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 21–27, Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 052851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv (CON)), 2009 WL 2429249).
65. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2138.
66. For a discussion of Markman hearings and the role of federal judges
in patent litigation, see Vincent P. Kovalick, Markman Hearings and Their
Critical Role in U.S. Patent Litigation, FINNEGAN, http://www.finnegan.com/
resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9a8bf39b-c419-4329-9f6a08ac0a647c7c (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
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E. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS—BEYOND PRICES
Assuming that monopoly power exists, the appropriate
antitrust test then becomes an inquiry into competitive effects
to determine “whether customers are better off under the
settlement than they would have been (in expectational terms)
under litigation” which is to ask “whether the settlement
resulted in an agreed-upon entry date later than what might
have been expected under litigation.”67
What motivates the concern about generic entry dates is, of
course, the expectation that prices will fall upon generic entry
and, obviously, earlier entry usually results in lower prices.
However, it is important to recognize that lower price is not a
perfect indicator of consumer welfare. Lower prices caused by
generic entry destroy the name brand manufacturer’s incentive
to invest in advertising and other marketing activities that
provide valuable information to physicians and their patients.68
The result could be (and often is) reduced sales of the drug at
the lower prices because many doctors and patients will not be
made aware of the benefits of the drug.69
IV. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Eleventh Circuit first articulated its scopeof-the-patent test, the debate about reverse payment
settlements has been strident and polarized. In effect, each side
of that disagreement has urged that these settlements
presumptively are either legal or illegal. In fact, however, there
is no economic support for either extreme position. In choosing
the middle ground by ruling that the settlements are properly
analyzed under the rule of reason, the Supreme Court has
rightly affirmed that whether or not a given settlement is
anticompetitive, procompetitive or competitively neutral is
ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. Some of the factors that will
inevitably need to be addressed in such analyses include

67. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2136.
68. See Cramer & Berger, supra note 48, at 124–25 (“As generics enter,
the usual response by the branded seller is to cease its marketing efforts for
that product and switch promotional efforts to a new brand-name product.”).
69. See id. at 125 (“[B]ecause the branded firm’s efforts to build and
maintain prescription volume ceases, and because generics typically do little
advertising or promotion, the emergence of generic entry correlates with a
plateauing of growth, or sometimes even a slight unit sales volume decline in
the specific drug molecule, despite the substantially lower average price.”).
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monopoly power, the characteristics and strength of the
patent(s) at issue, the extent of the reverse payment, if any, the
likely effect of the agreement on output and prices, and other
considerations that often enter into rule of reason inquiries.
Although such analyses can be burdensome and time
consuming in some cases, in other situations threshold
questions about monopoly power and patent strength may well
prove pivotal and thereby obviate the need for an extended,
full-blown rule of reason case.

